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1. Introduction to the controversy 
 
The cognitive and mental capacities of fish are a current topic of scientific controversy, and consciousness 
is the most contentious of topics. In a recent review article, Michel Cabanac and coauthors (Cabanac et al. 
2009) argue that consciousness did not emerge until the early Amniota, the group of species that includes 
mammals, birds, and "reptiles.” The latter term is in scare quotes because biologists consider it a paraphy-
letic group (i.e., a group that contains just a subset of the descendants of its common ancestor) that is im-
proper for classification purposes due to its exclusion of the birds, which descended from the saurians. 
Amniotes are characterized by an embryonic membrane that makes terrestrial reproduction feasible. The 
amphibians, lacking this adaptation, are constrained to place their eggs in an aqueous environment for 
proper development. These biological details are important because of the nature of some of the evidence 
that Cabanac et al. bring to bear on the question of consciousness in fish – evidence that I shall maintain 
seems skewed towards other adaptations that have to do with terrestrial life. 
But before getting into those details, it is important to recognize that Cabanac's is not a consensus 
view. For instance, in her book Do Fish Feel Pain? Victoria Braithwaite argues that "there is as much 
evidence that fish feel pain and suffer as there is for birds and mammals" (2010). What is this evidence? 
Braithwaite and her colleagues have pursued a number of interesting experiments over the years subject-
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ing fish (typically trout) to a variety of noxious stimuli (e.g., injection of bee venom into their lips) and 
then measuring various behavioral changes. Rainbow trout that received the bee venom treatment spent 
considerably more time over the next few hours, rubbing their lips on the bottom and sides of their tanks 
(Sneddon et al. 2003). Similarly they showed an increased gill rate, indicating higher respiration, and re-
duced feeding behavior (even when starved), less attention to novel objects placed in the tank, and ame-
lioration of all of these symptoms by morphine. All of these establish behavioral and physiological effects 
similar to those found in mammals, where it is largely a matter of scientific (if not philosophical) consen-
sus that there's no adequate basis for denying conscious pain experiences to them. 
As I shall discuss in greater detail below, the controversy over fish reasserts itself in the domain of 
neuroanatomy. Rose (2002) argues that fish nociception (i.e., sensory receptiveness to harmful stimuli) 
occurs without consciousness. Cabanac et al. (2009) argue circumstantially (albeit somewhat circum-
spectly) that the massive expansion of cortical tissue in the amniotes provides further evidence to support 
the division they propose. Their circumspection comes with reference to Merker's (2007) paper on con-
sciousness without a cerebral cortex, and their admission that there's no solid evidence to locate emotional 
and affective aspects of consciousness entirely within cortical tissue. Cabanac et al. also maintain that the 
expression of endogenous opioids in amniotes far exceeds that in amphibians and the various fish species. 
I will return to the neuroanatomical and neurophysiological issues later in the paper. It is worth noting 
here, too, that the category of "fish" provides another example of a paraphyletic group, so not a strictly 
recognized biological category. Furthermore it is an incredibly diverse group of organisms, accounting for 
more than 60% of the known vertebrate species. For these reasons, and more to be explained below, it is 
important to be cautious filling in the blank for any generalization that begins "Fish do ___" or "Fish have 
___.”  
Why should philosophers care about fish consciousness? Of course, philosophers of science are at-
tracted to scientific controversy – perhaps like gawkers at a road accident, albeit with dreams of perform-
ing a heroic rescue! – and some of this attitude will be evident throughout this paper. But what about oth-
er philosophers? For practical (or applied) philosophy, especially ethics, the issue is obvious. Many self-
described "vegetarians" consider fish to be fair game for their dinner plates. Fish cultivation is perhaps the 
most rapidly expanding part of animal agriculture, and already governments are scrambling to devise ap-
propriate regulations, and the agriculture industry is striving to know more about what makes fish healthy 
and perhaps happy. Furthermore, fish are increasingly finding a place in scientific laboratories as model 
systems for research into a wide range of genetic, neurological, and behavioral functions and dysfunc-
tions. The practical and ethical concerns are evident, for example, in the research of Braithwaite and oth-
ers who come out of so called "animal welfare science" – a branch of science has its roots in animal hus-
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bandry and veterinary medicine. Despite the ethical significance of this work, I shall not have anything 
specific to say about the ethics of eating or cultivating fish in this paper. 
For "theoretical philosophy,” as I will argue below, fish provide an interesting test of the boundaries 
of existing conceptions of cognition and consciousness. In addition, as I will also argue, the recent flurry 
of studies on fish provides some salutary lessons for the philosopher of cognitive science or animal be-
havior, helping us understand the limits of experimentation in these areas. For general philosophy, there is 
also an element of "Know thyself!" although fish are sufficiently alien that the reflection is sometimes 
hard to discern. (Curiously, in the "Great Chain of Being" – e.g., Didacus Valades 1579 depiction – fish 
have been depicted as below birds and above terrestrial animals; air and water being nobler elements than 
earth. Proximity to divinity has not always been a straightforward matter of physical resemblance to 
man.) 
In the remainder of this paper, then, I will be demonstrating that there are jobs for philosophers here. 
Many of the scientists participating in these debates have turned to philosophers for definitions of con-
cepts such as emotion and consciousness. Sometimes they have not handled what they have found in ways 
that philosophers would approve. See, for example, Gary Varner's (2011) review of Braithwaite (2010) 
where he maintains that she confuses feelings with complex thoughts, and gets carried away with the no-
tion of access consciousness (Block 1995) -- the availability of information in part of the system for glob-
al reasoning processes -- which Varner says is irrelevant to what really matters ethically, namely "phe-
nomenal consciousness" -- i.e., the subjective “what it is like” aspect of conscious experience. Here I dis-
agree slightly with Varner. Although some philosophers define phenomenal consciousness independently 
of access consciousness, this doesn't mean that they aren't as a matter of fact functionally relevant to each 
other (see below). However, I don't disagree either in general or specifics that scientists sometimes mis-
understand and therefore abuse philosophical distinctions. In addition to the work of conceptual clarifica-
tion (if not outright definition), philosophers of science bring a keen eye to certain staples of this debate, 
such as the use of arguments from analogy, inference to the best explanation, and frustration with the 
skeptical problem of other minds. Elsewhere I have argued that we have strategies for dealing with all of 
these, strategies that I shall illustrate below in the context of discussion of fish consciousness. Philoso-
phers may also sometimes be in the lucky position of being able to take in the big picture, assimilate ideas 
from a variety of fields, take a long view of the different roles played by various kinds of empirical stud-
ies on our understanding of possible forms of consciousness other than our own. 
 
2. The limits of definition 
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Michel Cabanac (pers. comm.) emphasizes the importance of definitions in enabling scientific communi-
cation. But definitions are negotiable. Cabanac et al. (2009) begin their paper with a reference to Bering 
and Borklund (2005) who define consciousness as “a higher-order cognitive system enabling access to 
intentional state.” Philosophers will associate such a definition with the work of Peter Carruthers (2000). 
However, Cabanac et al. don't mean "higher-order" in the same way that Carruthers and certain other 
higher order theorists do, that is in terms of explicit mental representation of first-order intentional states -
- thinking about thoughts. Rather, they speak in terms of processing of information through a "single 
mental space" (Cabanac et al. 2009, p.267) with sensory pleasure and displeasure providing the common 
currency for decision making by which the deliverances of different perceptual systems could be weighed 
against each other. (In Carruthers’ scheme, this is all realizable without higher-order thought.) Regardless 
of the merits or demerits of their conception, it helps us understand what Cabanac's experiments are in-
tended to support – namely the idea of pleasure or pain as the main currency for a "single mental space.” 
But it requires perhaps further argument to say that this is the right conception; or, better than an argu-
ment would be to establish through a long-term empirical research program that the definition is empiri-
cally productive and unifies several phenomena. 
The philosophical literature standardly makes several distinctions among meanings of consciousness. 
This is not the place to review them all, but for discussions of animal consciousness, five seem especially 
salient, with two of them proving most controversial (Allen 2010). These include the distinction between 
sleeping and waking states, perceptual awareness and sensitivity, access consciousness, phenomenal con-
sciousness, and self-awareness.  
The awake/asleep distinction is not usually in dispute when applied to mammals, although there has 
been controversy about whether fish sleep (Cabanac et al. 2009). The sense of consciousness implicated 
in the basic ability of organisms to perceive and thereby respond to selected features of their environ-
ments is not under dispute (the sense in which a minnow can be aware of a predator), although its rele-
vance to more controversial notions is disputed. The more technical notion of access consciousness was 
introduced by Block (1995) to capture the sense in which mental representations may be poised for use in 
rational control of action or speech. This “dispositional” aspect of consciousness, in which information 
content is available for other systems to use, although perhaps not currently being so used, is amended by 
Block (2005) to include an occurrent aspect in which the content is actively “broadcast” in a “global 
workspace” (Baars 1997), which is how it comes to be available for higher cognitive processing tasks 
such as categorization, reasoning, planning, and voluntary direction of attention. Block believes that many 
animals possess access consciousness (speech is not a requirement) although it's not clear what he thinks 
about fish.  
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The idea of a global workspace is perhaps close enough to the idea of "single mental space" to make 
this a plausible interpretation of Cabanac's conception, but for the fact that Cabanac et al. add the addi-
tional dimensions of feeling and/or emotion to the story. In this way they move closer to the philosophers 
sense of phenomenal consciousness -- the qualitative, subjective, experiential, or phenomenological as-
pects of conscious experience, sometimes identified with qualia. To contemplate animal consciousness in 
this sense is to consider the possibility that, in Nagel's (1974) phrase, there might be “something it is like” 
to be a member of another species. 
Finally, self-consciousness refers to an organism's capacity for second-order representation of the or-
ganism's own mental states. Because of its second-order character (“thought about thought”) the capacity 
for self consciousness is closely related to questions about “theory of mind” in nonhuman animals — 
whether any animals are capable of attributing mental states to others. Although questions about self-
consciousness and theory of mind in animals are a matter of active scientific controversy, I am not aware 
of any scientific studies about self-consciousness in fish – however, Desjardins and Fernald (2010) de-
tected a measurable difference in brain activity (via activity of marker genes) between a male cichlids 
challenging another male and one challenging its own mirror image.  
I shall have nothing else to say about self-consciousness in this paper, but all the other notions remain 
on the table for discussion. 
 
3. Are fish robotic? 
 
The idea that fish behavior might be entirely accounted for as fixed responses to specific stimuli leads 
some to suggest that fish are robots, relatively simple Stimulus-Response (S-R) machines driven in an 
inflexible way by current inputs. This view of fish as living entirely in the present is also manifested in 
the common myth that goldfish (Carrassius aureatus) have a 3-second memory span. This myth has been 
busted several times, most recently in August 2008 by an Australian 15-yr old schoolboy's science fair 
project in a story that got wide press coverage, although the American television show MythBusters did it 
earlier (Season 2 Episode 11; January 25, 2004; http://mythbustersresults.com/episode11) for a previous 
debunking. These (admittedly not peer-reviewed) experiments show that goldfish retain the effects of 
training for months. Of course, even taking the experiments at face value, they do not prove either flexible 
cognition or conscious memory of past experiences because the kind of behavioral conditioning that pro-
duces these lasting behavioral changes can happen at an entirely unconscious level in human beings, and 
simple S-R models are precisely concerned with such learning. 
A debate is currently active among comparative psychologists about whether evidence from experi-
ments on various animals – especially, e.g., rats (Babb and Crystal 2006; Zhou and Crystal 2009), and 
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birds (Clayton and Dickinson 1998; Clayton et al. 2006) – establish that they have more flexible forms of 
episodic memory, i.e., memories for specific events that can be deployed in circumstances not anticipated 
at the time of the experience. Some in the human literature (e.g., Tulving and Markowitsch 1998) have 
wanted to link episodic memories specifically to self-awareness (or "mental time travel,” in Tulving's 
words). Interestingly, in the neuroscience community, it is simply taken for granted that the experimental-
ists' methods tap into episodic memory in rats, and work is done on the underlying mechanisms (e.g., 
Eichenbaum et al. 2012). Nevertheless, regardless of one's willingness to call it "episodic memory,” or 
more conservatively "episodic-like memory,” there is now very credible evidence that rats and jays can 
use information gained in single experiences to act appropriately given new information that was not 
available at the time of the original experience. 
To my knowledge, no one has yet systematically investigated whether fish of any species possess epi-
sodic memory. But there are reports of one-trial learning – single experiences leading to adaptive changes 
in behavior. For example, Arai et al. (2007) report that a observation of a predator attack is sufficient to 
produce changes in the behavior of Japanese flounder Paralichthys olivaceus towards predators. And 
Schuster et al. (2006) showing that archerfish Toxotes jaculatrix, who use their gills to force jets of water 
through their mouths to knock insects into the water, can learn to hit moving targets accurately by repeat-
edly observing others do it, without having to practice the skill themselves. What mechanism could ac-
count for this is presently unknown.  
The diminished reputation of fish for being rather unsophisticated learners can perhaps be traced to a 
widely-cited paper by Bitterman (1975), who demonstrated a difference between the performance of 3 
goldfish and 2 rhesus monkeys in a reward matching task. When given a choice between two responses, 
one of which was rewarded 70% of the times it was selected and the other 30%, the goldfish "matched" 
by randomly selecting the 70% target 70% of the time, for an average return rate of 58% (= 
(.7x.7)+(.3x.3)) as measured over the course of 10 days of trials. The two monkeys, in contrast, ap-
proached 100% response to the 70% target after 10 200-trial blocks of training. This higher rate of return 
is arguably more “rational” insofar as the monkeys maximized their reward rate in these circumstances. 
Experimentation on goldfish as proxies for all fish is also evident in the work of Cabanac, already 
mentioned. Cabanac and Laberge (1998) investigated the response of six goldfish to two treatments (and a 
control). In the two treatment conditions, the fish were handled and injected with either a saline solution 
or pyrogens (fever-inducing bacteria). The fish were then placed in a pair of connected tanks, one at 37C 
and the other at 34C. After being injected with the pyrogens, the fish spent significantly more time in the 
cooler tank than during the unhandled control condition or saline-injected condition. Cabanac et al. argue 
that the fact that the saline-injected fish do not prefer the cooler tank shows that fish, in contrast to am-
niotes, do not have "emotional fever" – an increase of body temperature after events that might be ex-
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pected to cause an emotional response, such as the handling involved in receiving an injection. I shall re-
turn to Cabanac's bigger conclusion that fish therefore lack emotions below, but for now the point is just 
that a small sample of goldfish is used to draw conclusions about all fish. 
 
4. Unconscious but not asleep? 
 
In their 2009 review article, Cabanac and colleagues also suggest that the lack of play behavior and REM 
sleep in fish (and amphibians) further indicates a bright line can be drawn at the amniotes. The case of 
sleep is an interesting one. From an evolutionary perspective, it is usually considered that sleep is the 
harder state to explain. After all, sleeping animals are vulnerable to predation, and potentially missing 
feeding and reproductive opportunities. Of course, this is somewhat simplistic because daytime feeders 
may not have been able to find food at night, and they run the risk of being preyed upon by nocturnal spe-
cialists; and vice versa. Nevertheless, a 24hr cycle of activity and quiescence seems to be evolutionarily 
ancient and it is beyond doubt that many species of fish are less active during one phase of the day than 
during the other.  
Cabanac et al. (2009) argue, citing Nicolau et al. (2000), that the phenomenon of awakening depend-
ed on the evolution of brain cortex, and they restrict their definition of sleep to slow wave cortical activi-
ty. As far as I can tell, the argument by Cabanac et al. is not based on a direct investigation of any species 
of fish, but on a somewhat circular definition derived from the neural characteristics of the sleep/wake 
cycle in mammals. Fish don't have cortices, so they don't have slow wave activity in their cortices. But 
Nicolau et al. actually undermine this argument by claiming that despite the lack of cortex patterns, slow-
waves patterns in sub-cortical structures may be indicators of sleep. They go on to argue that something 
homologous to rapid eye movement (REM) sleep is likely in reptiles. 
The insistence by Cabanac on REM sleep is quite telling. The evolution of eye movement control in 
fish has followed a rather different trajectory than that in mammals. (For one thing, many fish species 
have independent eye movements that are bilaterally controlled, so it's far from clear why a particular pat-
tern of eye movements during sleep should be replicated at all in such a system.) No doubt REM move-
ment seems significant because it is associated in humans with dreaming, and we observe it in other 
mammals. But it is quite hard to know whether REM sleep is connected to dreaming in, say, dogs, even 
though it is tempting to interpret other simultaneous motor activity as (e.g.) the dog dreaming it is run-
ning. This, however, is sheer speculation, and the cognitive significance of sleep is hard to assess, alt-
hough sleep-deprived animals suffer impairments in learning (e.g., Graves et al. 2003; but see Cai et al. 
2009 for dissent), show various physiological changes, and suffer a rebound effect – needing to catch up 
on missed sleep – once the circumstances preventing sleep are removed. It is thus concluded that sleep 
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serves a biological need in similar to water, food, and other basic needs that must be caught up with after 
a period of deprivation. 
The idea that fish have somehow never (in evolutionary time, or their life times) woken up is, on the 
face of it absurd. Sleeping animals don't learn, don't eat, and even during rare episodes of human sleep-
walking show none of the reactive behavioral capacities that most fish display. But lest this become a 
mere terminological dispute, more specificity about a functional characterization of sleep is needed. Such 
work is sparse, but Yokogawa et al. (2007) have looked at physiological and behavioral aspects of the 
sleep state in zebrafish Danio rerio, comparing a wild type to a specific genetic mutant. They show that 
sleep deprivation in these fish also produces a rebound effect. They characterize sleep in terms of differ-
ent thresholds for arousal, with the sleep state having a higher threshold for arousal. By comparing the 
two genetic types, Yokogawa et al. (2007) localized a part of the regulatory mechanism to the anterior 
hypothalamic area, and they argue that the findings from the genetic mutants suggest "molecular diversity 
in sleep regulatory networks across vertebrates." But is it REM sleep? (A question posed to me by Caba-
nac when he heard about this.) Of course not, if REM sleep is defined by a particular pattern of neocorti-
cal activity, which is important to processes of memory consolidation in humans and perhaps other 
mammals. But to define sleep in terms of neocortical patterns, or to insist that only REM sleep is relevant 
to whether fish can be conscious in the sense of "not asleep,” is to prejudge an empirical question by 
mammalian anatomy. Convergent evolution may implement similar functions in structures that are not 
homologous. 
Sleeping fish should not be ruled out by definition, because functional convergence across different 
biological taxa should not be ruled out a priori. Indeed this raises an important point about taxonomic di-
versity. Just as there are different patterns of sleep across the mammals, one should expect there to be at 
least as much taxonomic diversity among fish. (In fact more, as the next section explains.) For the same 
sorts of reasons that porpoises (like migratory birds) have been found to sleep one half of their brains at a 
time, one might expect fish to show similar diversity between reef dwellers and the pelagic inhabitants of 
the open oceans. 
 
5. From goldfish to fish 
 
Thus far I have followed many authors in using "fish" generically as if this is a biologically appropriate 
category for making broad cognitive comparisons. In fact, it is something of a folk category (albeit a 
slightly scientifically-modulated category – for example insofar as it no longer contains whales and dol-
phins). Nevertheless, the group of organisms we intuitively call "fish" comprises several taxonomic 
groups and huge number of species – approaching 32,000 currently, and given the rate of discoveries es-
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timated to asymptote somewhere near 35,000. As such, these species account for around 60% of all verte-
brate species. Taxonomic classifications are currently undergoing enormous revisions, and fish are not 
excluded from this upheaval, so anything written in this paragraph could already be out of date by the 
time it is read. Nevertheless, several major divisions are recognized at the time of writing. These include 
the jawless fish (lampreys and hagfish), and the Gnathostomata, or jawed fish (the latter a paraphyletic 
group). The jawed fish include cartilaginous fish (sharks, rays, and "ghost sharks), the ray-finned fish 
(comprising the nearly 95% of all known species, including the Teleosts, or "bony" fish that make up the 
majority of the forms most familiar at fishmongers, pet shops, and touristic snorkeling spots), and the 
"lobe-finned" or "fleshy-finned" fish. This latter group includes the "living fossil" Coelacanth, the lung 
fishes, and is the lineage that gave rise to all the land vertebrates. This makes the latter group paraphylet-
ic, since some of its descendants (including ourselves) are not classified as lobe-finned fish. The lobe-
finned fish separated from the ray-finned over 400 million years ago, whereas the Teleosts do not appear 
in the fossil record until the Triassic period, between 250 and 200 million years ago. It is perhaps edifying 
to remind ourselves that tuna are more closely related to us than they are to sharks, and that coelacanths 
are more closely related to us than they are to tuna. (Thanks to Michael Trestman, pers. comm., for offer-
ing this succinct summary of the points about phylogeny.) 
The enormous radiation of fishes has led to tremendous diversity among them. Contrary to popular 
opinion, not all fish are ectothermic, or "cold-blooded.” Some sharks and several teleosts (e.g., some spe-
cies of tuna and swordfish) are partial or complete endotherms. Swordfish can raise brain (including eye) 
temperatures, while tuna maintain overall body temperatures well above ambient water temperatures. 
Sensory mechanisms are also diverse, and include modalities not familiar to humans. For example, many 
fish rely on their lateral line organs to sense changes in water pressure, and in some species these have 
been modified into electroreceptors capable of sensing electromagnetic fluctuations in the 1 KHz range. 
The so-called "weakly electric" fish have also been measured to produce such fluctuations at the same 
rate, which is believed to have a communicative function (Zhou and Smith 2006). 
The mating and reproductive systems of fish are also extremely diverse. Most fish species are egg 
layers (oviparous), but some hold the eggs internally until they hatch (ovoviviparous) and some even have 
a proto-placental arrangement to support the developing embryos (viviparous). The diversity of these ar-
rangements is also mirrored in the varieties of parental care (or lack thereof) shown towards hatchlings. 
Male seahorses are famous for the fact that it is the fathers who protect eggs and hatchlings. Mate fidelity 
is present in some species, but by no means all, and sometimes such "monogamy" is socially- or envi-
ronmentally-regulated (Whiteman and Côte 2004). Some species of fish are sequential hermaphrodites, 
starting life as females but becoming male if they survive to become the largest member of their group. 
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Given such enormous diversity, one must be very careful when speaking about "fish" generically, and 
even more cautious about drawing conclusions about all fish, based on experiments conducted with just a 
few representatives of one species. Goldfish may be convenient and cheap to use in experiments, but at 
best representative only of closely-related species, and maybe not even fully representative of their own 
species if raised in artificial conditions. Irrespective of the question of representativeness, the fact that the 
thermoregulatory responses of an aquatic ectotherm ("cold-blooded") species are different from those of 
terrestrial vertebrates is of questionable use for a strong argument. The common ancestor of the Amniotes 
and the Teleost fish was neither and amniote nor a teleost, and the modern fish are separated by hundreds 
of millions of years of independent and very significant evolution from that common ancestor. The signif-
icant changes that have occurred are often masked by the hydrodynamic demands of swimming in water, 
such that to our untrained eyes, most fish look rather similar over vast evolutionary differences. 
 
6. From brainstem to telencephalon 
 
Some of the arguments about fish capacities have been predicated on neural differences between fish 
brains and mammal brains. For example, Rose (2002) states: 
 
The fundamental neural requirements for pain and suffering are now known. Fishes 
lack the most important of these required neural structures [extensive frontal and parietal 
neocortical regions], and they have no alternative neural systems for producing the pain 
experience. Therefore, the reactions of fishes to noxious stimuli are nociceptive and 
without conscious awareness of pain. 
 
To say that these mammalian structures are required for pain is, of course, to beg an important ques-
tion. Even if neocortical structures are required for mammalian pain experiences, it does not follow that 
they are required for fish. There are issues concerning convergent evolution and multiple realizability of 
mental capacities here, and the neuroscience cannot stand alone. Behavioral and physiological measures 
are essential too, if the neuroscientific evidence is to be interpreted correctly. 
The telencephalon (forebrain) of fish (any species) is a poorly understood structure whose function is 
not well understood. Neuroscientist Klaus-Peter Hoffman, who has conducted single-cell recording in fish 
brains (Masseck and Hoffman 2008) reports that it is very hard to find evidence of electrical activity in 
the telencephalon, and neuron counts appear low in that structure, although he admits this may be an arti-
fact of the staining methods used (pers. comm.). In comparison, the fish midbrain (mesencephalon) is 
much developed, especially in teleost fish, and there is considerable variation among different species. 
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7. From learning to cognition 
 
With those caveats out of the way, what is known about the cognitive capacities of various fish species? 
The answer is more than before, but still not much. Recent studies have documented that that groupers 
Plectropomus pessuliferus and moray eels Gymnothorax javanicus engage in extended bouts of coopera-
tive hunting (Bshary et al. 2006) and data have been presented to argue that cleaner wrasses Labroides 
bicolor are more likely to take a chunk out of clients they are less likely to encounter again (Oates et al. 
2010). The capacity of mosquitofish Gambusia holbrooki to estimate the number of individuals in a group 
has been studied (Dadda et al. 2009), as have the tool-using abilities of stingrays Potamotrygon castexi 
(Kuba et al. 2010 ). Like comparative studies of animal cognition in general, some of this work tends to-
wards what I have elsewhere called “trophy hunting” (Allen, forthcoming). Nevertheless, it underscores 
the point that "fish" should not be dismissed as cognitively uninteresting en masse. 
The observational learning in archerfish discussed above is not an isolated instance of social learning 
(reviewed by Brown and Laland 2003). Such studies should make us wonder about the robustness of Bit-
terman's (1975) results, reported to show that goldfish have a less optimal form of learning than monkeys, 
since there was likely considerable differences between the fish and the monkeys in the opportunities for 
learning and social interaction, and well as other potentially significant experiences, before they entered 
Bitterman's experiment. The point is underscored by a more recent experiment involving cichlid fish of 
the species Simochromis pleurospilus showing that the ability of adults to learn was affected by whether 
or not the individuals experienced a single change in feeding regime during the first nine months of their 
lives. Fish that were maintained on a constant low quantity diet or constant high diet did worse a year lat-
er on a learning test than fish that had experienced a switch either from low to high or high to low once 
during the developmental period (Kotrschal and Taborsky 2010). This study illustrates the importance of 
experience during development for cognition (see also Stotz and Allen 2011), and should make us worry 
about the importance of unreported and uncontrolled differences in the handling and thus the experiences 
of different species in comparative experiments such as Bitterman's.  
 
8. From cognition to consciousness 
 
So, we have before us an array of evidence for greater cognitive and learning sophistication among a 
handful of fish species, militating against any blanket conclusions covering the entire paraphyletic group. 
But what does this tell us about consciousness in the sense that excites concerns about the ethical treat-
ment of fish? It depends, of course, on one's preferred theory of "phenomenal consciousness.” I will not 
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attempt a thorough survey here (see Allen 2010). Rather, I focus on my own view (Allen 2004; Allen et 
al.  2005; Allen et al. 2009) which takes certain kinds of learning to be better indicators of consciousness 
than others because they connect theoretically to accounts of phenomenal consciousness that emphasize 
the role of "appearance states" (roughly, how things seem to the animal) in enabling flexible error correc-
tion and information integration from multiple sources over various timescales. This is how, as mentioned 
above, phenomenal consciousness may be related to access consciousness, for access to how things ap-
pear can be important to learning. For instance, Clark and Squire (1998) showed that in human subjects, 
"delay conditioning,” in which a learned response to a conditioned stimulus (CS) that overlaps temporally 
with another that already produces the response (the US, for “unconditioned stimulus”) can occur without 
any explicit knowledge of the relationship. In contrast, "trace conditioning,” which requires retention of a 
memory trace in working memory for pairing with a later stimulus, is perfectly correlated with subjects 
learning about the relationship between two stimuli and their ability to report verbally on that relation-
ship; those subjects who were unable to report on the relationship were exactly those who failed to ac-
quire the response to the CS. It is suggestive in this context that Clark and Squire showed that rabbits, like 
humans, were 100% conditionable in a delay conditioning experiment, but similarly only about half of 
them learned the response in trace conditioning involving the same stimuli. Recently, trace conditioning 
has been investigated in a handful of species including Atlantic cod Gadus morhua (Nilsson et al. 2008), 
Atlantic halibut Hippoglossus hippoglossus (Nilsson et al. 2010), and rainbow trout Oncorhynchus mykiss 
(Nordgreen et al. 2010). Vargus et al. (2009) also suggest that one of the functions of pallial areas of fish 
brains is to support trace conditioning. 
Full operant conditioning, in which a wide range of stimuli can be flexibly connected to a wide range 
of behavioral actions, is also worthy of further investigation for the light it can shed on conscious experi-
ences. Operant conditioning involves the reinforcement of spontaneously produced behavior by subse-
quent events. What gets reinforced need not be a specific motor pattern, but a goal-directed response that 
can flexibly recruit alternative movements -- e.g., by using a different limb to execute the response if the 
original one is blocked. Kirsch et al. (2004) argue that it is hard to explain operant conditioning in hu-
mans without cognitive involvement involving conscious expectancies. Allen et al. (2005) also argue that 
the operant conditioning in place preference learning task can be used to study the dissociability of affec-
tive and sensory components of pain, thus enabling an experimental approach to assessing the different 
dimensions of the pain experience in animals. More specifically, an animal that has been given a moder-
ate dose of morphine may react by pulling away from a noxious stimulus such as a mild electric shock, 
but show no tendency to move away from the place where the noxious stimuli are delivered (absence of 
place-preference conditioning). In such a system, it might be possible to disentangle the affective (bother-
some) aspect of pain from its sensory (nociceptive) dimensions. However, some caution is necessary 
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since some analogs of the phenomena used to argue for conscious mediation of learning have been found 
in the spinal cords of rats (Allen et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the forms of instrumental learning exhibited in 
the spinal cord are not as sophisticated as fully flexible operant conditioning. To my knowledge, there has 
been relatively little systematic investigation of operant conditioning in fish (but see Tennant and Bitter-
man 1975).  
 
9. Conclusions 
 
B.F. Skinner (1984) speculated that "it would not be hard to teach a fish to jump from a lower level to a 
higher one." I suspect that he was thinking of salmon and never actually tried this with any fish, particu-
larly not a flounder. I have argued that given the diversity of fish species and the limited extent to which 
they have been studied, blanket statements about fish cognition and consciousness are not responsible. 
Previous studies that seemed to show limited capacities of certain fish in specific experiments may be due 
to developmental or ecological factors that were not controlled in those experiments and are perhaps as 
yet unimagined. Fish provide an important group of species for studying evolutionary convergence of be-
havior and cognition despite neurological differences. Neither a purely behavior approach nor a purely 
neurological approach to arguments about cognition and consciousness is tenable. The possibility of con-
vergent evolution at the behavioral and cognitive levels despite morphological and anatomical differences 
at the neurological level makes fish an enormously interesting testing ground for ideas about multiple re-
alizability of cognition  
When it comes to ethical questions concerning fish welfare, standards of evidence may be different 
for practical philosophy versus theoretical philosophy or science. Practical ethics cannot wait for all the 
relevant aspects of every species of fish to be scientifically investigated, but must also be wary of the 
dangers of overreaching (see Allen 2006 for more elaboration of this point). Theoretical philosophers and 
scientists can afford to be more cautious and skeptical of claims about fish cognition and consciousness, 
but must also be careful to respect the limits of experimental methods. Unfortunately, the vast majority of 
fish species are likely to remain empirically inaccessible, perhaps forever. Nevertheless, it is encouraging 
to see behavioral and cognitive investigations being conducted on species such as cod and halibut that are 
becoming increasingly important to human agriculture. 
Philosophers have much to learn and much to contribute in this fascinating area. There is work to be 
done linking the various capacities that are shared among members of the same species, or unique to indi-
vidual organisms, to issues of ethical and general philosophical concern. It is no longer adequate for us to 
throw up our hands at the apparent impossibility of knowing what it is like to be a member of another 
species, based solely on the kind of information than one could glean from a children’s encyclopedia. In-
14 
stead, motivated philosophers have the opportunity to help test and expand the limits of our current scien-
tific and philosophical conceptual schemes by engaging more thoroughly with sciences, thereby coming 
to appreciate and help organize human understanding of the enormous behavioral, neurological, and cog-
nitive diversity among the vast array of species lumped together under the deceptively simple label of 
“fish.”  
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